Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported her client’s prayer that the applicants should be ordered to furnish security for due performance of the Court of Appeal decree before they are granted a full stay of execution for the following reasons. First, that the applicants reside outside Uganda, and that they do not have any assets within the country known by the respondent. Secondly, counsel argued that their client, having been the successful party in the Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 79 of 2009, was entitled to “enjoy the fruits of her judgment.” Thirdly, she argued that there was no pending appeal. Fourthly, she argued that the applicants would not in any way be prejudiced by the order to deposit security for due performance of the decree and that furthermore, since the applicants had no pending appeal, none would be rendered nugatory. Counsel for the respondent also relied on Ahmed Mohamed Kisuule vs. Greenland Bank (in liquidation) Supreme Court Civil Application No. 10 of 2010 and Lawrence Musiitwa Kyazze vs. Eunice Busingye, SCCA No. 18 of1990 to support her contentions.
Finally, counsel for the respondent opposed the applicant’s alternative proposal to deposit Shillings 5,000,000/= because the amount is too little, taking into account the amount of general damages of Shillings 100,000,000/=, which the Court of Appeal awarded to the respondent and the outstanding taxed costs of Shillings 24,000,000/=. She proposed that the applicants be ordered to deposit Shillings 50,000,000/= as security for due performance of the decree as a pre-condition for the court’s ordering of a full stay of execution.
In rejoinder, counsel for the applicants argued that his clients were not permanently resident abroad and that in any case the respondent could still execute the Decree under The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, Cap 21, Laws of Uganda, because the United Kingdom has a reciprocal arrangement with Uganda, if she was successful in the appeal before this court. Counsel for the applicants informed court that the respondent had already partly executed the decree and is already in possession of the land she sued to recover.