Court name
Supreme Court of Uganda
Judgment date
21 November 2012

Pentecostal Assemblies of God Ltd v Transsahara International (U) Ltd & Anor (Civil Appeal-2010/10) [2012] UGSC 12 (21 November 2012);

Cite this case
[2012] UGSC 12
Short summary:

Civil Procedure, Attachment of Property

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA [CORAM: ODOKI, CJ., TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, JJ.S.C]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10 OF 2010

 

PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLIES

                                                                        OF GOD LTD ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::APPELLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR

  1. TRANS SAHARA INTERNATIONAL

       (U) LTD::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT/JUDGMENT DEBTOR

  1. THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT

       OF OFFENDERS (UNAFRI) ............................ RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR

[Appeal arising from the Judgment of the Court of Appeal (Mpagi-Bahigeine, Engwau, Kitumba, JJ.A.) dated 4th December, 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006].

This is a second appeal against the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006 which upheld the ruling of the High Court releasing from attachment a Park Yard belonging to the respondent/objector, the United Nations African Institute for Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, (hereinafter referred to as UNAFRI). The appellants, (Pentecostal Assemblies of God Ltd), had sought to attach the said Park Yard in satisfaction of a judgment debt owed to them by the respondent/judgment

 

debtor, Transsahara International (U) Ltd., (hereinafter called the first respondent), in High Court Civil Suit No. 711 of 2004.

 

 On 1st October 2003, UNAFRI entered into a 5 year lease agreement with the first respondent where UNAFRI agreed to hire out the parking yard to the respondent at a cost of Uganda shillings 5,000,000/= per month.

In 2004, the appellant entered into an agreement with the first respondent for the sale of a Toyota Hilux Double Cabin Pick Up at a cost of 40,000,000/= million Uganda Shillings. The appellant paid the first respondent through 2 cheques, which were acknowledged by the first respondent's lawyers vide a receipt dated 30th June 2004. The first respondent failed to deliver the vehicle.

On 22nd September 2004, the appellant filed High Court Civil Suit No. 711 of2004 against the first respondent, seeking recovery of the amount paid, costs of the suit and any other relief that the court deemed appropriate. On 16th November 2004, the parties entered into a consent judgment, where the first respondent agreed to pay the appellant Uganda shilling 44,000,000/= million Uganda Shillings, in three installments. If the first respondent defaulted in paying any installment, the whole amount would become payable plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

The first respondent failed to pay the first installment of 10,000,000/= million Uganda shillings, which was due on 26th November 2004. Consequently the appellant applied for a warrant of execution, which the High Court issued on 7th December 2004, on following terms:-

 

 

"By way of attachment and sale of judgment debtor's unregistered lease interest in immovable property to wit - Inland Car Depot (ICD) called TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (U) LTD on Plot 1, Naguru Road near UNAFRI, plus demurrage, storage and all fees due to Transsahara International (U) Ltd., exclusive of Government taxes to recover Uganda shillings 48,000,000/= plus costs of execution estimated value of Uganda shillings 50,000,000/="

By the time the warrant of attachment was issued, UNAFRI had issued the first respondent with a letter dated November 17, 2004 threatening to terminate the lease agreement for non-payment of rent, which was in arrears.

According to the warrant of attachment, no sale could take place until after 14 days from the publication or notification of the sale. There is no evidence on the record of appeal to show what steps the appellant's counsel took to execute the warrant.

On 7th January 2005, the day that the warrant was returnable to court, UNAFRI filed High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 10 of2005. Proceeding under Order 19 rules 55 (2), 56 and 57 of the Civil Procedure Rules, UNAFRI sought for the unconditional release from attachment the leased park yard, on grounds, among others, that:

"(a) the judgment debtor's lease with the second respondent had been terminated for failure to pay rent and

            (b)         the subject property which had been attached was not the property of the

second respondent, who was merely in temporary occupation. "

The application was heard by Mukasa J., who ruled in favour of UNAFRI on 13th January 2006. He accordingly released the parking yard from any envisaged attachment and also awarded costs to UNAFRI.

 

 

The appellant then filed Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006 in the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. Being dissatisfied with the Court's decision, the appellant filed this appeal relying on four grounds of appeal which will be reproduced later in this judgment. The appellants prayed to this Court to allow their appeal, set aside the judgment and orders of the Court of Appeal and the High Court and to also award them the costs of this appeal and in the courts below.

The appellant was represented by Kasozi, Omongole & Co. Advocates while Munanura­ Mugabi & Co. Advocates represented UNAFRI. Both counsel filed written submissions in support and against the appeal. Counsel for the appellant argued each ground of appeal separately while counsel for UNAFRI argued all the grounds jointly. No submissions were filed for the first respondent. I will handle ground 1, grounds 2 and 3 together and ground 4 separately.

Ground 1 of appeal

1.        That the Honourable learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and

fact in holding that UNAFRI had legal capacity to sue and be sued.

In arguing this ground, counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact in holding that UNAFRI had legal capacity to sue and be sued. He contended that the UNAFRI Statute was never ratified by the Parliament of Uganda, as was required by the 1967 Constitution of Uganda and that it did not therefore have the effect of law. He disputed the contention of counsel for UNAFRI that the Statute was not a Treaty under the 1967 or the 1995 Constitution, but a Statute adopted by the United Nations pursuant to the United Nations Resolution 1979/40.

 

 

Counsel for the appellant further argued that the Cabinet Minutes of 16/7/87 minute 320 which UNAFRI sought to rely on, was only a Cabinet decision, where the Cabinet agreed that the Minister of Internal Affairs should be responsible for the circulation of the relevant pages on the establishment of UNAFRI. He contended that the minute did not amount to ratification, as there was no mention of ratification of the Statute, which was necessary to make it a law in Uganda.

Counsel for the appellant also reiterated his earlier argument before Court of Appeal that the process whereby the Minister signed the UNAFRI Statute on 23rd  May 1988 was only an accession of the Statute, and that this did not confer any legal rights on UNAFRI in Uganda.

On the other hand, counsel for UNAFRI supported the findings and the decision of the Court of Appeal. He argued that while the Uganda Government had not ratified the UNAFRI Statute as was required by Article 76 of the 1967 Uganda Constitution, which was then in force in Uganda, the Ugandan Government indeed signed the UNAFRI Statute on May 23, 1998. He further argued that it is this Statute that granted UNAFRI the capacity to sue and to be sued.

Secondly, he argued that Uganda had also signed an agreement agreeing to host the headquarters of UNAFRI in Kampala Uganda. He urged this court to uphold the Court of Appeal's finding that UNAFRI had capacity to sue and to be sued.

Let me now turn to examine the legal provisions relied on by counsel for the appellant regarding the issue of ratification of the UNAFRI Statute. Article 76 of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda provided as follows:

"   (1)  Subject to the provisions of this article, the President or a person authorized by him in that behalf may make treaties, conventions, agreements or other

 

 

arrangements between Uganda and any other country or between Uganda and any international organization or body in respect of any matter.

      (2)       A treaty made under the provision of this article shall be in such terms as may be approved by the Cabinet and, subject to the provisions of clause (3) of this article, shall be subject to ratification by the Cabinet.

      (3)        Any treaty, convention, agreement or other arrangements made by virtue of this article which relates to armistice, neutrality or peace shall be subject to ratification by the National Assembly signified by resolution of the Assembly. "

It should be noted that this article, under clause (1), differently referred to "treaties, conventions, agreements or any other arrangements." By so doing, it is evident that the framers of the Constitution envisaged that these four items could mean different things and that the Government of Uganda could enter into anyone of the mentioned arrangements with either another country or any international organization. It is also important to note that clause (2) of the same article only mentioned "treaties" made under article 76 as requiring the ratification of Cabinet, unless they were covered by clause 76(3) and yet under clause (3), "all treaties, conventions, agreements or any other arrangements which relate to armistice, neutrality or peace were required to be ratified by the National Assembly (which was then the Parliament of Uganda)."

Following the promulgation of the new Constitution of Uganda in 1995, the execution of treaties, conventions and agreements was provided for in similar terms under Article 123 as follows:

           "(1)      The President or a person authorized by the President may make treaties, conventions, agreements between Uganda and any international organization or body, in respect of any matter.

 

 

            (2)       Parliament shall make laws to govern ratification of treaties, conventions, agreements or other arrangements made under clause (1) of this article."

In 1998, Parliament passed the Ratification of Treaties Act, Chapter 204, Laws of Uganda, in accordance with the Constitution. Section 2 of the Act provides for ratification of treaties as follows:

"All treaties shall be ratified as follows:

            (a)      By the Cabinet in the case of any treaty other than a treaty referred to in paragraph(b) of this section: or

(b) By Parliament by resolution---

                      (ii)          Where the treaty relates to armistice, neutrality or peace; or

                     (ii)       In the case of a treaty in respect of which the Attorney General has certified in writing that its implementation in Uganda would require an amendment of the Constitution. "

Turning to the present appeal, the question is whether the UNAFRI Statute was a Treaty. Counsel for the appellant did not adduce any evidence before court to prove that the UNAFRI Statute was a Treaty and hence failed to discharge his burden of proof.

But even if this court were to find that indeed the UNAFRI Statute was a Treaty, I find that neither article 76 of the 1967 Constitution of Uganda, nor article 123 of the Ugandan Constitution 1995, read together with section 2 of the Ratification of Treaties Act, required the UNAFRI Statute to be laid before the Ugandan Parliament for ratification, as counsel for the appellant argued. This is because the UNAFRI Statute does not relate to "armistice, neutrality or peace" and there is no evidence on the record of appeal that was adduced by counsel for the appellant to show that the Attorney

 

 

General had certified that the implementation of the UNAFRI Statute required an amendment of the Constitution.

Furthermore, Article 287 of the Uganda Constitution saved any treaties and agreements to which Uganda was a party before the coming into force of the 1995 Constitution. It provides as follows:

"Where ---

            (a)         Any treaty, agreement or convention with any country or international organization was made or affirmed by Uganda or the Government on or after the ninth day of October, 1962, and was still in force immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution; or

            (b)         Uganda or the Government was otherwise a party immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution; and Uganda or the Government, as the case may be, shall continue to be a party to it."

In light of the above findings, I have found no legal basis for the arguments of counsel for the appellant with respect to the issue of ratification of the UNAFRI Statute.

I will now turn to examine the issue of whether UNAFRI had capacity to sue or to be sued. Having disposed of the appellant's Constitutional contentions about ratification, the issue of whether UNAFRI had capacity to sue or not to sue is a legal matter, which can be resolved by examining the legal instrument that set it up, that is, the UNAFRI Statute. The relevant provisions are set out in the lead judgment of Mpagi-Bahigeine, J.A. (as she then was) as follows:

 

“ the Institute shall have the capacity to

 

 

        (a)         Enter into contracts;

        (b)        Acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and

        (c)        Sue and be sued."

Justice Bahigeine not only relied on the above provision to hold that UNAFRI had capacity to sue or to be sued, but also dealt extensively with similar arguments to those that counsel for the appellant made to this Court.

Furthermore, the learned Justice of Appeal also relied on Article IV, section l(a) of the hosting agreement that the Government of Uganda signed with UNAFRI on 15th June 1989, which provides as follows:

"The Institute as an intergovernmental body operated under the aegis of the ECA, shall have in Uganda, the status of a body corporate with the capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of immovable or movable property and to institute legal proceedings. "

UNAFRI is an inter-governmental organization that was created in 1988 by the member States of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to promote cooperation of governments and other actors, such as non-governmental organizations and academic institutions, in the area of crime prevention and crime justice. UNAFRI is therefore a creature of an intergovernmental Statute that derives its nature, mandate and functions from this Statute. The government of Uganda signed this Statute and the hosting agreement. By so doing, it recognized UNAFRI with all the features and powers that the UNAFRI Statute bestowed on it. The provisions cited from the UNAFRI Statute show that UNAFRI was given the status of a body corporate, with capacity to enter into contracts and to sue. This agreement was in existence before the 1995 Constitution

 

 

came into force. Counsel for the appellant never adduced any evidence during the hearing of the objector proceedings to support the appellant's claims that UNAFRI did not have capacity to sue or to be sued. He merely relied on the Cabinet Minutes, which are not on record for this Court's review. He also relied on the admission by counsel for UNAFRI that the Statute had never been ratified, for his contention that UNAFRI did not therefore have capacity to sue or to be sued. Given my discussion above, I am not able to agree with the arguments of counsel for the appellant faulting the decision of the learned Justices of Appeal on UNAFRI's legal status in Uganda. There is no merit in ground 1 of appeal and it ought to fail.

Ground 2 and 3 of appeal

These grounds were framed as follows

  1.       That the Honourable learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and

fact in holding that the property was subject to attachment though the attachment was never properly executed nor was there any attempt to have it renewed.

  1. That the Honourable learned Justices of Appeal erred in fact in upholding the objection having rightly held that the judgment debtor was in physical possession of the property as of tit December, 2004 .

Counsel for the appellant submitted with respect to ground 2 of appeal that the learned Justices of Appeal erred in holding that the park yard was not properly attached, after the same Court had rightly held that the first respondent was in possession of the park yard, as at 7th December 2004. Relying on the authority of Joseph Mulenga vs. FlBA (U), Miscellaneous Application No. 308 of 1996, and Order 19, rules 55 and 57 of the Civil Procedure Rules, counsel for the appellant argued that the Court of Appeal was required

 

 

to consider only one question: that is whether the first respondent had been in possession of the attached property at the time the court issued attachment warrant. He argued that once the court found this issue in the affirmative, as it did in this case, it should not have upheld UNAFRI's objection to the attachment. Counsel further argued that UNAFRI had not demonstrated that it had actually re-entered the leased premises.

With regard to the issue of the appellant's failure to renew the warrant, counsel for the appellants argued that the appellant had intended to renew it. He contended that the appellant was however prevented from doing so by the Court vacation which was expiring on 15th January 2005 and by UNAFRI's action of seeking and obtaining a stay of execution and by the immediate filing of UNAFRI's Objector application on 7thJanuary 2005, the very day the warrant expired.

With regard to ground 3 of appeal, counsel for the appellant faulted the learned Justices of Appeal when they held that the park yard was not properly attached, although the first respondent had been found to have been in possession as at 7th December 2004. Counsel for the appellant relied on the case of Charles Kassaja vs. Registrar of Titles, High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 51 of 1993 in support of his argument that UNAFRI'S letter terminating the respondent/judgment debtor's lease did not amount to a re-entry in law.

Counsel for UNAFRI argued grounds 2, 3 and 4 together. He supported the findings of the Court of Appeal to the effect that there had been no attachment of the park yard. He argued that there was no evidence of attachment at all since the appellants had neither posted any advert either in the press or at the parking yard to that effect, nor filed a return with the Registrar.

Regarding the appellant's arguments that the judgment debtor was still in possession of the parking yard, counsel for UNAFRI reiterated their position that UNAFRI had

 

 

terminated the first respondent's lease. He urged the court to take cognizance of the fact that being an inter government organization enjoying diplomatic community, UNARI could not have carried out a forceful eviction of the first respondent from the attached park yard other than serving the first respondent with letters of termination. Counsel did not cite any authorities to support his arguments. Lastly, counsel urged the court to dismiss this appeal.

I have considered the submissions of both counsel on grounds 2 and 3 of appeal. Counsel for the appellant, for reasons best known to him, chose to distort the holding of the Court of Appeal on the attachment of the parking yard. The Justices of Appeal held that as at 7th December 2004, the date the warrant of attachment was issued, the first respondent was still in possession of the parking yard. The Court of Appeal however noted that although the park yard was subject to attachment starting on 7th December, 2004, that did not mean that the park yard had been successfully attached. The Court of Appeal rightfully further noted that the appellant did not adduce any evidence whatsoever to show that it or anyone acting on its behalf, ever put up the required 14 days' notice indicating the time, place and conditions of the sale before the sale could take place. The Court also noted that there was no evidence to show that the appellant ever made any attempt to renew the warrant of attachment. Given all the above, the learned Justices of Appeal rightfully held that the warrant was "never properly executed nor was there any attempt to have it renewed."

Secondly, counsel for the appellant's arguments in respect of ground 3 of appeal were contradictory and self defeating, when considered alongside the arguments counsel for the appellant had earlier made in respect of ground 1 of appeal. In the first instance, counsel urged this court to hold, with respect to ground 1 of appeal, that UNF ARI did not have the capacity to sue. The same counsel urged this court to hold, with respect to ground 3 of appeal, that the attachment of the park yard in satisfaction of the first

 

 

respondents' judgment debt was valid. If I were to follow and agree with the main submissions of counsel for the appellant on ground 1 of appeal, it would follow that UNAFRI did not have the legal capacity to enter into the unregistered lease Agreement which gave rise to the interest of the first respondent, which the appellant applied to attach in fulfillment of their judgment debt. In that case, it would also follow that the unregistered lease that UNAFRI granted to the first respondent/judgment debtor was not valid either.

The Court of Appeal rightly held that the warrant which had been issued in respect of the UNAFRI park yard was never executed and that there was no attempt to renew it. The Court also rightly upheld the objection despite its finding that the first respondent was in physical possession at the time the warrant of attachment was issued. There is therefore no merit in grounds 2 and 3 of appeal and they too should fail.

Ground 4 of appeal

This ground was framed as follows:

“4       That the Honourable learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and

fact in not properly evaluating the evidence on record thus arriving at a wrong decision. "

In arguing this ground, counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Justices of appeal erred in law when they failed to re-evaluate the evidence adduced on the alleged ratification of the UNAFRI Statute. He argued that the evidence on record only proved that the Government of Uganda had signed the UNAFRI Statute on 23rd May 1988. He further submitted that this accession did not amount to ratification of the Statute as is required by the Constitution of Uganda. He argued that had the learned Justices of Appeal properly re-evaluated the evidence on record, they would have found that UNAFRI had no locus to sue.

 

 

Counsel for the appellants relied on the decisions of Kifamunte Henry vs. Uganda Supreme Court, Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 1997 and Pandya vs. R., (1957) E.A. 336, to support his contentions that the Court of Appeal failed in its duty to re-evaluate the evidence on record and to come to its own conclusion.

I have already held in respect of the first three grounds of appeal that the learned Justices did not err in fact or law in dismissing the appellant's appeal. The learned Justices of Appeal properly evaluated the evidence on record and reached the right decision. The Court of Appeal's evaluation of the evidence appears in the lead judgment of Mpagi ­Bahigeine, J.A. (as she then was) on page 2- 6, 8 -11, 14 -16 and 19-21. I have found no merit in this ground and it too ought to fail.

I would therefore dismiss this appeal with costs to UNAFRI, in this court and the two courts below.

                                                   Dated at Kampala this         21st  day of      November 20I2 .

                                                   ............................................................... .

HON. DR. ESTHER KISAAKYE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

  1.  

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

 AT KAMPALA

 

(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J, TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESlGYE AND                           KISAAKYE, JJ. S.C)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10 OF 2010

 

PENTESCOSTAL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD LTD::::::::::::::::::APPELLANT/JUDGMENT                                                                                                           CREDITOR

 

 

 

 

TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (U) LTD :::::::::::::::::::::::: JUDGMENT DEBTOR

 

 

 

THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR

PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT

 OF OFFENDERS UNAFRI ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR

 

[Appeal from the judgment the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, DCJ, Engwau, Kitumba JJA) dated 4 December 2008, in Civil Appeal No 23 of 2006]

 

 

JUDGMENT OF ODOKI, CJ

 

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned sister, Kisaakye JSC, and I agree with it and the orders she has proposed.

 

As the other members of the Court also agree, this appeal is dismissed with costs to UNAFRI, the respondent/objector, in this Court and the Courts below.

Dated at Kampala this ...................... 21st...................... day of November 2012.

 

 

B.J ODOKI

CHIEF JUSTICE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

AT KAMPALA

 

[CORAM: ODOKI, CJ, TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESIGYE AND KISAAKYE, JJ.S.C]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10 OF 2010

 

BETWEEN

 

PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLIES OF GOD LTD::::::::::::::::::::::APPEALLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR

AND

 

TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (U) LTD::::::::::::::::::::::JUDGMENT DEBTOR

 

 

THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN

INSTITUTE FOR PREVENTION OF CRIME

AND TREATMENT  OF OFFENDERS UNAFRI :::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR

 

 

 

 

{Appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, Engwau & Kitumba, JJA) dated ()4Ib December, 2008 in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006.)

JUDGMENT OF J.W.N. TSEKOOKO, JSC.

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned sister, Dr. Kisaakye, JSC., and I agree with her conclusions and the orders she has proposed that the appeal be dismissed with costs to UNAFRI, the respondent/ objector, in this Court and two Courts below.

Delivered at Kampala this 21st day of  November 2012.

 

 

J.W  Tsekooko.

Justice of the Supreme Court.

 

 

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

AT KAMPALA

[CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESIGYE, & KISAAKYE, JJ.SC]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10 OF 2010

 

BETWEEN

PENTESCOSTAL ASSEMBLIES

OF GOD LTD :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT I                                                                                                          JUDGMENT CREDITOR

 

AND

1. TRANSSAHARA INTERNATIONAL (U) LTD::JUDGMENT DEBTOR

 

 

2.THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF

OFFENDERS UNAFRI :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR

[Appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Mpagi-Bahigeine, DCJ, Engwau, & Kitumba, JJ.A) dated 4th December 2008, in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2006].

JUDGMENT OF KATUREEBE, JSC.

I agree with the judgment of my learned Sister, Kisaakye, JSC., that this appeal be dismissed. I also concur that the 2nd respondent, UNAFRI, be awarded costs in this Court and the Courts below.

            Dated at Kampala this 21st......... day of November 2012.

 

 

 

Bart M. Katureebe

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

AT KAMPALA

 

CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, JJ.S.c.)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10 OF 2010

BETWEEN

 

 

PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLIES

                                                                                    OF GOD LTD           APPELLANT/JUDGMENT CREDITOR

  1. TRANS SAHARA INTERNATIONAL

       (U) LTD ..................................................................... RESPONDENT/JUDGMENT DEBTOR

  1. THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT

       OF OFFENDERS (UNAFRI) ............................... …….RESPONDENT/OBJECTOR

 

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned sister, Dr. Kisaakye, JSC.

 

I concur with her in the decision she has made that this appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed. I also concur in the orders she has made.

Dated at Kampala this .....21st ... day of .... November 2012

 

 

JOTHAM TUMWESIGYE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT