I have considered the submission by respective counsel regarding the two preliminary objections. I uphold the submission by Mr. Dagira that S.98 CPA applied where the law does not expressly provide a procedure.
See ALCON INTERNATIONAL LTD V. KASIRYE B. BYARUHANGA CO. ADVOCATES 1996 HCB 61.
It is also trite law that a party to a dispute cannot ordinarily invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court under s.98 CPA if another
express remedy is available AHAMED HASSAN MULJI V. SHIRIMBAL JADAVJ  EA 217.
In the instant application however, the application is not solely premised on the inherent powers of this court. The application was brought under o.51 r.6 and O.52 RR 1, 2 and 3 CPR. I would only fault
the applicant for parading S.68 CPA first as if it is the primary basis under which this application was brought. The practice has
been that this section is cited last after the principle provisions of the law applicable have been listed. It would be better to refer to the said section last.
It is now settled that the existence of specific remedies to various issues under litigation no longer restricts or exclude exercise of inherent powers of court for the ends of justice to be realized. It was held by Kasule J.
and I agree, in STANDARD CHARTERED BANK OF UGANDA V. BEN KAVUYA & BARCLAYS BANK (2006) 1 HCB 134 that:
“It is now settled that the existence of a specific procedure provision or remedy cannot operate to restrict or exclude the courts
inherent jurisdiction under S.98 of the Civil Procedure Act which gives undue residual powers to the court to prevent or correct
In my view, citing S.98 CPA together with the other enabling provisions would not be fatal to the application or prejudicial to the
respondents. It would be so if a lazy lawyer brought the application solely under S.98 CPA yet enabling laws do exist.
Regarding the second objection I agree with Mr. Dagira that the proper section to have been invoked by the applicant to ask court
to admit his appeal out of time is S.79 (1) of the CPA (ibid). The said law empowers an appellate court for good cause to admit an
appeal though the period of limitation prescribed by the Act has elapsed.
A literal interpretation of O.51 r.6 CP shows that the said rule does not apply to time frames fixed by the Act but rather time fixed for doing certain acts under the rules or orders of court. It states that:
“6. Where a limited time has been fixed for doing any act or taking any proceedings under these rules or by order of court(emphasis added), the court shall have power to enlarge time upon such terms, if any, as the justice of the case may require………..”
Therefore this application ought to have been brought under S.79 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act and O.52 r.(1) CPR. This application
is incompetent and misconceived for having been brought under S.98 of the CPA and O.51 r.6 CPR instead of s.79 (1) of the CPA and O.52 r.1 CPR.
It is struck out with costs.
Both parties in court.
Madaba for Applicant.
Dagira for Respondent.
Matter for ruling.