THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT JINJA
CIVIL REVISION NO. 0005 OF 2006
(Arising from Jinja Chief Magistrates’ Court Miscellaneous
Application No. 40 of 2006)
NTALO GEORGE :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPLICANT
BABIRYE EDINANSI :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT
BEFORE: HON. LADY JUSTICE IRENE MULYAGONJA KAKOOZA
The grounds of the application were that the LCI Kamuli Road acted with material irregularity when they purported to hear an unregistered case with no clear claim or description of the case on a public holiday (i.e. 09/10/05, Independence Day). Further that the court passed the judgment on the same day in the absence of the applicant and as a result he was not informed of his right to appeal. Further grounds were that the Chief Magistrate acted illegally or with material irregularity when she issued a warrant to evict the applicant and put the respondent in possession of the property.
The facts on which the application was based can be summarised as follows. In his affidavit in support of the application the applicant inferred that he was the occupant of the land in issue till the 18/08/2006 when he found three of the grass-thatched houses thereon the land had been demolished by a court broker. The applicant claimed that he was not aware of any suit that could have resulted into an order for eviction except a claim that the respondent had lodged against him with the Human Rights Commission, but which had not been concluded. The applicant later discovered that the structures had been demolished by one Oundo Robert by a warrant of eviction issued by the Chief Magistrate at Jinja in Misc. Application No. 40 of 2006 arising out of a judgement declared by the LC1 Court of Kamuli Road, Rubaga Parish. The applicant further deposed that he recalled that on the 9/10/2006 the same LC court summoned him and he reported at the appointed place. That the LC court asked him questions about the land that he occupied but he was not notified that the respondent had filed a claim against him in respect of the land.
The applicant further averred that he was not informed that judgment had been delivered in favour of the respondent. Neither was he informed that he had the right to appeal against the judgment. Further that at the alleged hearing he had not been given an opportunity to call witnesses or to produce documentary evidence to prove how he acquired the land in dispute.
In her affidavit in reply the respondent averred that the suit land belonged to her husband the late Ssosipateli Sajjabi to whom she was legally married until his death on 1/07/2005. That the property was acquired jointly by the deceased and her after they got married in 1969 and it therefore formed part of the deceased’s estate. The respondent further averred that after the death of Ssosipateli Sajjabi the applicant forcefully prevented her from occupying and cultivating the suit land. That as a result the applicant was facing criminal charges in the Magistrates Court at Jinja for trespass, threatening violence and intermeddling in the deceased’s estate. Further that the Administrator General was the Administrator of the estate of the late Ssosipateli Sajjabi. Aggrey Wagubi, one of the Administrators General confirmed this in his affidavit. He averred that on 27/03/2005 the Administrator General obtained letters of administration in the estate. That at a meeting held on the 15/07/2007 he established that the respondent was the widow of the deceased. That he instructed the applicant to vacate the land but the applicant refused to do so. As a result the A.G instructed the police to press charges against the applicant for intermeddling. Subsequently the applicant was charged in Jinja Criminal Case No. 187 0f 2007.
In a further affidavit in reply Owere Wilson the Vice Chairman of the LC of the area in which the disputed land is situated averred that he was one of the members of the LC who gave judgment against the applicant in a suit that was lodged by the respondent. He further averred that the LC court in his village usually sits on Sunday. That before the 9/10/2007 the applicant was summoned to the LC court on two occasions but he did not respond to the summons. That he finally responded on 9/10/2005 when the court disposed of the matter in favour of the respondent after hearing both parties. That though the applicant was ordered to vacate the suit within 14 days after the judgment he refused to do so. As a result he referred the matter to the LCII Court for further action. There was no evidence to show that the LCII court dealt with the matter. It would appear that is why the respondent filed an application in the Chief Magistrate’s court for execution of the orders of the LCI court.
At the hearing of the application Ms Mildred Nassiwa for the applicant submitted that the LC I court had no jurisdiction in land matters because s.30 of the Land (Amendment) Act (2004) introduced a new section, s. 76A into the Land Act. By virtue of s.76A the Parish or Ward Executive Committees were established as the courts of first instance for land matters. It was further contended for the applicant that the eviction order that resulted from these proceedings was null and void and had no legal effect. Further that prosecution of the applicant for criminal trespass was also based on the order of the Chief Magistrate and was therefore improper. Counsel for the applicant also challenged the respondent’s reliance on the grant of letters of administration to the Administrator General for the reason that the grant was made in 2007 after this application was filed in 2006. She contended that the grant was obtained to sabotage the application for revision of the Chief Magistrate’s order. She prayed that the application be allowed.
In reply, Ms. Juliet Musoke for the respondent opposed the application. She submitted that the Administrator General had powers over the property in dispute since letters of administration were granted to him. That the application before court was of no consequence because it sought to obtain orders for ownership of the property yet the property is part of an estate under the trusteeship of the Administrator General. Further that if court made any orders in favour of the applicant in respect of the property such orders would challenge the powers or authority of the Administrator General over the estate. With regard to the legality of hearing the suit in the LC court on a public holiday, Ms. Musoke submitted that there is no law that prohibits an LC court from disposing of matters on a public holiday.
(ii) Could the LCI court lawfully hear and dispose of a case on a public holiday?
(iii) Did the LCI court have the jurisdiction to entertain the case before it?
With regard to the serial number of the case, s.17 (2) of the Executive Committees (Judicial Powers) Act provided that subject to the Act, the court would hear the case before it expeditiously and without undue regard to technical rules of evidence or procedure. The Act thus reproduced the provision in Article 126 (2) (e) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda that substantive justice shall be dispensed without undue regard to technicalities. I am therefore unable to agree with counsel for the applicant that the mere fact that the record bore no serial number rendered the proceedings a nullity.
Turning to the question of hearing the case on a public holiday, it is true that the 9/10/2005 was Independence Day in Uganda and is a gazetted public holiday. The Vice Chairman of the LC confirmed that the case was heard and disposed of on that day. He explained that the day was not only a public holiday but also a Sunday. Further that the court was in the habit of sitting on Sundays because that was when most of the members were able to spare time for their LC duties since they were also employed elsewhere. Although Counsel for the applicant complained about the LC not observing the public holiday she did not cite any law that prohibits public institutions or public officers from executing their duties on public holidays. I have not found any either.
On the contrary the Public Holidays Act which provides a schedule of public holidays to be observed in Uganda also provides for remuneration of persons, both in the private and public service who may have to work on a public holiday (s. 3). S.4 of the Act provides that Government is bound by the provisions of s.3 of the Act, i.e. it has to pay its employees who sometimes have to work on public holidays. By implication working on a public holiday is not illegal if the employee is paid for it. The fact that the court sat on Independence Day did not therefore invalidate the proceedings of the court. It was in fact done in compliance with the Executive Committees (Judicial Powers) Act which also provided that matters brought before LC Courts had to be disposed of expeditiously. If a public holiday presented itself as one on which the court could expeditiously dispose of the case, it was its duty to do so.
The applicant’s further complaint was that the court did not give him the opportunity to call witnesses to prove his case and that this also rendered the proceedings irregular. I carefully perused the translation of the record of proceedings in the LCI Court, Annexure “C2” to the affidavit in support. There is no indication that the applicant informed the court that he needed to call witnesses to prove his case. The court could not be faulted for that.
Schedule 1 Part 2 of the Executive Committees (Judicial Powers) Act provided that LC courts could try matters relating to trespass. Schedule 2 provided that the court could hear cases in respect of land held under customary tenure. However, s. 30 of the Land (Amendment) Act removed this jurisdiction from the court when it introduced s. 76A, vesting the jurisdiction in land matters at first instance in the Parish or Ward Courts. The Land Amendment Act, 2004 came into force on the 18/03/2004. There is therefore no doubt that when it sat on 9/10/05 the LC1 Court of Kamuli Road, Rubaga Parish had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. The judgement that resulted from the proceedings was therefore null and void for want of jurisdiction.
I finally come to the question whether the Chief Magistrate failed to exercise her jurisdiction in this matter and whether she acted in the exercise of her jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity or injustice. The judgment being challenged was delivered on 9/10/2005. The Chief Magistrate gave her order of eviction on 18/08/2006 in an application that had been filed on 28/07/2006. By the time of filing the application and granting the order for eviction the Local Council Courts Act, of 2006 had come into force on the 8/08/06. S. 40 of the Local Council Courts Act provides that the general powers of supervision over Magistrates’ Courts conferred upon the High Court by the Judicature Act may be exercised by the Chief Magistrate over local council courts on behalf of the High Court. The general powers of supervision vested in the High Court which are in turn vested in the Chief Magistrate include preventing the abuse of the processes by the magistrates’ courts. In addition the general powers of supervision by magistrates are provided for by s.221 (1) of the Magistrates Courts Act (MCA). Section 221(2) amplifies them as follows:
The applicant prayed that this court should under its revisional powers declare the eviction order null and void and order that the applicant be put back in possession of the land in dispute. It has during these proceedings transpired that the land which is the subject of the dispute is now under the authority of the Administrator General as the Public Trustee. Mr. Wagubi, Assistant Administrator General, swore an affidavit in which he stated that he established in a family meeting that the respondent was indeed the widow of the deceased. Following s. 26 of the Succession Act, Schedule 2 thereof sets out the rules relating to the occupation of residential holdings of deceased persons. Rule 1 (1) thereof provides:
The applicant proposed that he would have the grant made to the Administrator General revoked. He is free to do so if he has better rights to administration or probate than the Administrator General. He is also at liberty to challenge the applicant’s occupation of the suit property in a court of competent jurisdiction. What ought to be noted is that widows and widowers are the only persons entitled to apply for letters of administration without first consulting the Administrator General (s.5 (1) Administrator General Act). They therefore have better rights to administration than any other beneficiary, except an executor of a will.
In conclusion, being in possession of additional facts provided by the Administrator General and which have not been successfully rebutted by the applicant, for the moment I am unable to make an order evicting the respondent from the disputed land and putting the applicant back in possession thereof. Section 83 of the Civil Procedure Act from which this court’s powers of revision derive provides that the High Court may revise the case and may make such order in it as it thinks fit; but no such power of revision shall be exercised where, from lapse of time or other cause, the exercise of that power would involve serious hardship to any person. I am of the view that the period of 3 years since the applicant was evicted and the respondent reinstated is a long time. I have declared that the judgment handed down by the LCI Court was illegal and so the dispute between the parties still stands unresolved. In the circumstances granting an order that the respondent be evicted might not only occasion a serious injustice but it would also occasion undue hardship to her. It would also be premature. It is now the duty of the Administrator General to divide the estate according to the law; I am sure he/she will do so if his/her powers are not challenged by the applicant in court.
In the end result the application only partially succeeds. The judgment of the LCI court of Kamuli Road, Rubaga Parish delivered on the 9/10/2005 in favour of the respondent is hereby set aside but the respondent shall remain in occupation of the suit premises until further orders of a competent court. Each party shall bear its advocates costs for this application. It is so ordered.