THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
N THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA
IVIL APPEAL NO. 79 OF 2003
(Arising out of Civil Suit No. 12 of 2001)
ATTORNEY GENERAL===================== APPELLANT
CE BALIRAINE ================== RESPONDENT
RAM: HON. MR. JUSTICE GEOFFREY KIRYABWIRE, JA.
HON. LADY JUSTICE l
.E. TIBATEMWA, JA.
HON. MR. JUSTICE KENNETH KAKURU, JA.
al from Judgment of the High Court at Kampala by His Lordship Yorokamu Bamwine, J
2'd July, 2002 in Civil Suit No. 120f2001).
JUDGEMENT OF HON. KENNETH KAKURU, JA
This is an
appeal from the judgment of His Lordship Y. Bamwine, J as he
dated 2nd July, 2002.
llant was sued by respondent in a representative capacity. The
t was employed under a contract by a government project known
as Rural Water and Sanitation Project (RUWASA). The contract which
1996 was renewable yearly. On 3rd May 2000 her contract was
and extended to 31/12/2000. On 12th July 2000 her contract was
by a letter dated 12/7/2000. She successfully sued the
. The learned trial judge found that the contract had been
terminated. He awarded her 10.000.000/= as general damages.
The appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment brought this appeal.
appeal first came for hearing before this court on 09/07/2007,
Namutebi was holding brief for Mr. Mohamed Mbabazi. The
nt was unrepresented. She appeared in person.
er proceeded with counsel for the appellant making oral
submissions. Upon closure of the appellants' submissions, the respondent
empted to reply. However court sensing the danger of allowing an
nted litigant to proceed with her own appeal advised her to
unsel. The matter was adjourned on that account.
al did not come up for hearing again until 6th September 2013
more than six years later. When the appeal was called for hearing Ms.
was in court appearing for the appellant. The respondent was not
in court. T
his court decided to deliver judgment since the appeal had been
lbeit in part by the respondent but more so because the
t had not instructed counsel to represented her more than seven
years after this court had ordered her to do so. The court record did not
notice of instructions. The court then decided to proceed with
gment based on what was on record, as the respondent had
comply with the court order issued on 9/7/2007, directing her to
ants set out four grounds in their Memorandum of Appeal. They
at learned trial judge erred in law and fact when he misdirected
mself and failed to properly evaluate the evidence.
learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he
sconstrued the law relating to termination of employment.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he found that
espondent was sexually harassed.
e learned trial judge erred in law and fact when he awarded
.000.000/= as compensation embarrassment, mental torture,
venience and as damages for wrongful dismissal after finding
that the respondent was not entitled to anticipatory damages.
loss as what the appellant's complaint is, in ground one. It seems
to me that i
t is now a practice that every memorandum of appeal must
th such a general ground. Am unable to ascertain from this
e judge's alleged error in law or fact. Am unable to ascertain
how the judge misdirected himself and how he failed to properly
ll unable to ascertain how the error and the misdirection effected
gment or led to a wrong conclusion. Am inclined to think that both
s 1 and 2 offend the provisions 0 .Oreer 86(1) of the Rules of this
That Rule provides as follows:-
A Memorandum of Appeal shall set forth concisely
and under distinct heads, without argume
narrative, the grounds of objection to the de
appealed against, specifying the points whi
alleged to have been wrongly decided, an
nature of the order which it is proposed to a
court to make. (Emphasis mine)
nds of appeal must therefore concisely specify the points which
ed to have been wrongly decided. General grounds such as
grounds 1 & 2 which do not concisely specify the points of objection offend
ions of Rule 86 (1) of the rules of this court, above cited
ce of advocates setting out general grounds such as grounds 1 &
2 in this a
ppeal that allow them to go on a general fishing expedition at the
the appeal hoping to get something they themselves do not
know, must end.
On that a
ccount I would strike out both grounds 1 and 2.
Katumba Byaruhanga Vs Edward Kyewalabye Musoke, (CACA 2 of
orted in (1999) KALR P.621.
In that c
ase the appellant had set out two grounds of appeal in his
dum of Appeal as follows;
1. The learned judge erred in and in fact in ordering the result of
the election of LCV Chairperson, Kiboga be cancelle
election as LCV Chairperson Kiboga be set aside
consequently that fresh elections be held.
2. The learned judge erred in lawn and in fact in passing judgment
after the starting period of ninety days thereby renderi
judgment of the lower court null and void.
At the co
mmencement of the hearing counsel for the respondent raised
objection to ground one above. He contended that it was too general and
the provisions of Rule 85 (now 86) of the Rules of this Court. The
was upheld by a full bench of this court. (Berko, Twinomujuni and
JA). The above decision and others notwithstanding, advocates
nue to frame general grounds of appeal that clearly offered the
provisions of Rule 86. This must stop.
Even if I
had allowed both grounds to stand I would still have dismissed
them on a
ccount that they were both not proved.
I have re
ad the pleadings, the proceeding at the lower court, the judgment
of the lea
rned trial judge. I have also read the submissions of counsel for
the appellant in this court. I have found nothing to remotely suggest that the
ial judge misdirected himself or any issue of law or fact, or that he
failed to e
valuate the evidence.
On the co
ntrary I think he did properly evaluate that evidence on record .
I must a
dd that evaluation of evidence usually .e·r:+tit+es court looking at
0 evidence as adduced by both sides and contrasting it with the law.
In this ca
se it is only the respondent who was the plaintiff at the High Court
ed evidence in support of her case. Although the appellants had
filed a Wr
itten Statement of Defence, they did not appear in court when the
s called for hearing. They offered no evidence at all at the trial.
The only evidence available for evaluation was that of the respondent. The
ial judge evaluated it well and in my view came to the correct
It is comm
on ground that the respondents' contract was renewed on 3rd
and terminated on 12/7/2000. That it was extended or renewed
after a comprehensive evaluation. If therefore there was any reason for
it ought to have occurred between 3rd May and 12th July 2000.
s none. The written statement of defence was brief. It was a
enial. Paragraph 4(i) of the WSD in fact admits that that the
t's contract was terminated under Clause 16.2, 16.3 and 19.1 of
and conditions of service, it states in part;
~t no time were the terms and conditions of service as
S. 16.2, S. 16.3 and S. 19. 1 breached in
relations to the plaintiff...
now that the above conditions were breached because none of
stances for termination set out in 16.2 applied to the respondent
10 at all. When the respondent in writing requested for the reasons for her
n, the employer failed to provide any.
I find absol
utely no reason to faulter the judgment of the learned trial judge
in this reg
ard. I agree with him entirely. As I have already stated grounds
one and t
wo must fail.
As regards ground 3 of the Memorandum of Appeal. The respondent
ied in court. She gave a very detailed account of persistent sexual
by her boss. The trial judge who saw her and heard her
believed her. The appellant elected not to attend the trial so the
was never cross examined. Her testimony stands
unchallenged. This is how the trial judge narrated the respondents' ordeal -
at page p.3
of his judgment:-
he plaintiff gave a heart rendering account at how the seta
Ssozi for a long time demanded to have a good time w
how he demanded to have sex with her on the eve
referendum election day and how he grabbed keys
home, how she asked for one day leave to pray for salvation
and how upon her return she was terminated on claims t
had failed to trace a personal fax massage to Mr. Ssozi's
ned trial judge correctly found that the respondent had been
sexually harassed. I agree with him. Accordingly ground 3 must fail.
Ground 4 i
n my view is misconceived as the learned trial judge awarded
10.000.0001= as general damages. He was entitled to do so. The
as not awarded as anticipatory damages as counsel for the
Having found that the respondents' employment was unlawfully terminated
the trial j
udge rightly in my view went on to find that she had suffered
rture, embarrassment and inconvenience. The appellant is not
ng the quantum of damages but the principle upon which they
arded. I find that the learned trial judge applied the correct
nd must also fail.
Had the r
espondent filed a cross appeal seeking to enhance the award of
would not have hesitated to award her at least
000/=. However she did not cross appeal and I have no basis
to interfere with the discretion of the learned trial judge.
Accordingly this appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs in this
court and in
the court below.
Dated at Kampala this 27th ..day of September 2013.
JUSTICE OF APPEAL.